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andrea Westlund’s account of love involves lovers becoming Plural Subjects mirroring 
margaret gilbert’s Plural Subject Theory. however, while for gilbert the creation of a plural 
will involves individuals jointly committing to pool their wills and this joint pool directly 
normatively constraining those individuals, Westlund, in contrast, sees the creation of a 
plural will as a ongoing process and she rejects the possibility of such direct normative 
constraint. This rejection appears to be required to explain the flexibility that allows for a 
central place for reciprocity in loving relationships. however, this paper argues against the 
existence of such flexibility and presents instead the case that variance in the normative 
pain of rebelling against the collective will should be understood by replacing gilbert’s 
notion of all-or-nothing pooling of wills with an account that sees wills as becoming 
entangled through levels of identification with the plural subject.
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“Whenever infatuation begins, if given the opportunity 
it transforms itself into a continuing romantic love .... 
With this continuing romantic love it feels 
to the two people that they have united to form 
a new entity in the world, what might be called a we.”
 (nozick 1995,  232)
two strangers kissing on a hedonistic night out drinking may well remain 
nothing more than lustful individuals, however on many accounts of love 
(such as that of robert nozick quoted above) moving beyond such initial 
stages of desire involves becoming united in some real sense; a move from 
a mere set of separate is into a combined we. marriage might be thought to 
be the clearest form of such a move, with its formal vows and declarations, 
however such relationships are possible without legal ties and for want 
of a name i will dub this kind of  relationship a “committed romantic 
relationship”, for brevity henceforth referred to as a crr1. talk of becoming 
a we may well fit with our experience of love but is it literally true? even when 
we are most deeply in love  we remain distinct biological entities; never 
actually becoming one creature with two heads. to meet the challenge 
of making sense of this it seems obvious to look to the growing literature 
around what has been called “collective intentionality”. of particular 
relevance to nozick’s work is the “Plural subject theory” (Pst) of margaret 
gilbert; for his talk of forming a we mirrors her focus on “... the central sense 
of the pronoun ‘we’” (gilbert 1992,  152) but i will start with the account 
of crrs proposed by andrea Westlund as, while in some ways similar to 
gilbert’s Pst account2, it poses some illuminating challenges to it.
Westlund suggests that crrs (or as she calls them relationships of “companion 
love”) (Westlund 2008,  558) involve the formation of a plural subject with a 
particular structure; a structure that respects the reciprocity that she sees 
as essential to love. While Westlund invokes the idea of a plural subject she 
1 i do not want to claim that my description of crrs stipulates the only way people can be in 
love, rather just that it describes a kind of loving relationship we commonly form.
2 in her paper on marriage (2008) Westlund does not explicitly state that she is attempting 
to apply a gilbert-esk framework, indeed she makes reference to an number of other authors 
(Bratman, 1999, roth 2004, searle, 1990, tuomela & miller, 1988, and Velleman, 1997) and seems to 
imply that her account is relatively neutral between them. however, the way in which she invokes 
the notion of “pooling of agency” and sets out the notion of a “shared practical perspective” does 
appear to be particularly fitting with Gilbert’s framework. Her engagement with Gilbert is more 
explicit in an earlier draft of her paper (published as a “working paper”, Westlund, 2005). she does 
not appear to have read the work where gilbert most explicitly deals with love (gilbert, 1996) 
though she does appear to be acquainted with a great deal of gilbert’s work.
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rejects the claim that normative constraint arises directly from being part of 
one. She thinks this necessary to account for the flexibility between parties 
she sees at the heart of loving relationships. this normative constraint is a key 
element of gilbert’s theory and i will challenge Westlund’s rejection of it but 
in doing so i will argue that crrs do demonstrate a related phenomena that 
might be confused with  
Westlunds flexibility i.e. variability of the pain of resisting such constraint. 
my tentative solution will be to urge the replacing of gilbert’s discrete (i.e. 
all-or-nothing) voluntary pooling of the wills with a continuous (i.e. open 
to various degrees) notion of wills becoming entangled through levels of 
necessary identification with the plural subject.
Westlund worries that the union view of love insomuch as it seems to 
suggest that lovers become psychologically or ontologically melded 
appears to be contrary to something fundamental to her understanding 
of crrs: reciprocity. reciprocity seems to require each agent to value 
the other’s interests. the union view appears to dissolve the interests of 
each into the we. What we can call the “problem of reciprocity” is the worry 
that it is not possible to value the interests of the other if they have been 
dissolved into a we. rather than give up on the union view Westlund 
believes this problem can be overcome by developing an account of 
the union in question that does not entail melding. she takes this to be 
possible if the union is of the form (à la gilbert) of the creation of a plural 
subject.
For gilbert plural subjects are the willed creations of individual agents; 
they are the result of those agents jointly committing to, within a certain 
scope of activity, pool their agency. imagine a couple taking a trip together, 
for gilbert what makes their travelling together stronger than merely 
travelling in proximity (temporal and/or spatial) is that the agents can be 
said to have jointly manifested and accepted “... willingness to constitute 
with the other a plural subject with the goal that they travel in each others 
company” (gilbert 1992, 163). Plural subject-hood thus involves agents 
remaining as individuals, i.e. merely placing some of their agency into a 
shared pool, a pool with a specific goal or stance, rather than becoming 
psychologically or ontologically melded. Westlund is not entirely clear on 
how introducing the notion of plural subjectivity helps but i believe we 
can read her as saying that it avoids the problem of reciprocity because 
forming a plural subject need not destroy the self and thus the interests of 
each individual remain intact.
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Plural agents can be transitory; e.g. the travellers in gilbert’s example 
may have met for the first time at the train station and travel together 
solely for one trip, or they can have more open-ended/extended scopes; 
e.g. the travellers may be regular fellow commuters. clearly crrs are of 
the latter type, indeed in marriage the participants pledge to be as one 
until death parts them. so far so good, but we might ask, given that plural 
subjects can have all kinds of implementations, what is the specific scope 
of a committed romantic relationship? gilbert suggests that it might be 
“... a specific primary goal: something like the well-being of both parties 
equally”(gilbert 1992). While Westlund sees reciprocity as a vital part 
of what it is to be in a crr she does not think that it is the direct goal of 
crrs rather she claims that it characterises the nature of how crrs try 
to achieve their main goal, which is simply living as one. living as one 
will involve all sorts of immediate shared goals; to go for a walk, to buy 
a sofa, to discipline their child etc. but always “... the projects and plans 
undertaken by companion lovers are ways of realizing an overarching 
desire to be (and do) together” (Westlund 2008,  558).
 
For Westlund achieving the goal of living together in a loving way has two 
elements; firstly,  sharing reasons as well as sharing ends, and, secondly, 
sharing these in a way that engages with the individual interests of each 
party. sharing in ends means together aiming at doing particular things as 
a couple. sharing in reasons, means together taking certain considerations 
to count in favour for them as a couple to do those things. together these 
can be thought of as a process of forging a plural will. take a couple who are 
planning to go on holiday; on Westlund’s account this can be contrasted 
with strangers who, having won a game show, are negotiating a single 
location to be whisked away to – the important difference is that the 
couple’s aim is not just to come to independently converge on a single 
destination, rather, their aim is to make the decision jointly. so, rather 
than weighing up all their individual preferences and trying to find a 
holiday that merely maximises these as far as possible, the couple will 
try to find reasons that they can agree count in favour of a holiday for 
them jointly; e.g. “i love culture and my partner loves beer but we want to 
go to majorca because we want to go somewhere hot”3. all of which is not 
to say that joint considerations about what counts as a reason for them 
jointly cannot take each individuals preferences into account, just that 
what counts as their collective preference is not automatically given by 
3 the example with a slightly different presentation is Westlund’s (2009,  1)
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finding the point of maximum cross over between individual preferences. 
thus discussion ends not with the discovery of shared reasons but rather 
in their creation through joint acceptance (Westlund 2009, 6). in this sense 
the plural will is a “... joint product of collective deliberative agency” 
(Westlund 2008, 567). 
For gilbert the plural will is created by individuals pooling their 
personal wills. doing so does not mean that they are then left with no 
individual will, for our wills are not finite substances, but it does mean 
that (within the scope of the area of concern of the we in question) they 
are rationally committed to whatever the plural will is committed to; by 
voluntarily taking part in the plural will they become joined to it. the 
joint nature of this plural will means that it is under the control of the 
participants together; no one participant is individually in a position to 
unilaterally reject its demands by a simple personal change of mind or 
declaration. For example, gilbert says of a couple walking together that, 
if one abandons the walk, the other might well rebuke them by saying 
“you can’t turn round, we said we would walk to the top!” the normative 
authority of the plural will arises directly from the nature of the joint 
commitment required for the construction of a plural subject – the plural 
will, formed collectively, can only be changed or rescinded collectively 
(see gilbert 2008, 504). this gives rise to the following two criteria. Firstly, 
the obligation criteria which says that each participant has a pro tanto 
obligation to promote fulfilment of that which is intended by the plural 
will. secondly, the permission criteria which says that participants 
understand that they are not (ordinarily) in a position to unilaterally 
“by a simple change of mind” remove the constraints imposed on them 
by the obligation criteria4. For gilbert this normative constraint is not 
some additional feature of morality, peer pressure or politeness, rather 
it arises directly from the collective will – it is akin to the normative 
constraint that as individuals we face with our own intentions; e.g. if i 
intend to give this paper today but i actually stay in bed, then i have done 
something normatively wrong – likewise if we intended to together give 
a paper today but we stay in bed then we have done a similar wrong. the 
key difference between the plural will and one’s individual will is that we 
are in a position to unilaterally change our individual wills however each 
4 gilbert (2000,  17) though note, gilbert allows that background conditions may allow an 
individual to control the plural will, e.g.“if one partner is discovered to have engaged in sexual 
activity with a third party, the offended partner may aver, ‘We’re through!’ and the other may 
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individual is not in a position to unilaterally change the plural will.
Westlund does not give a direct argument against the general possibility 
of such normative constraint5. however it is, she believes, contrary to her 
account of crrs. in contrast to a plural will that each participant becomes 
joined to, Westlund’s (not fully spelled out) view is that the creation 
and maintenance of a plural will involves an ongoing ‘dance of union, 
separation and reunion’, that is, it involves individuals being engaged in an 
“evolving framework” of plural stances to which they must “continuously 
reaffirm”. Westlund does not discuss Gilbert’s scenarios of dissent, such 
as the two walkers above – if she did she would have to reject the picture 
gilbert paints for her view implies that with regard to collective plans 
each participant must have “ …some discretion over her own follow-
through” (Westlund 2009,  14). that is not to say that Westlund wants 
to claim that the plural will does not have any kind of sway over each 
individual. if this were the case then it would be hard to see how it could 
play the role of making the reasoning of couples in crrs fundamentally 
different from that of the game show bargainers. however, Westlund 
explains such sway by claiming that it exists because there is a further 
commitment to a robust form of mutual accountability.
We might think that Westlund needs to differ from gilbert in this way in 
order to solve the problem of reciprocity. the concept of plural subjects 
is supposed to solve the problem of reciprocity because it allows the 
possibility of forming unions without losing each partner’s individual 
autonomy. Further, for Westlund a key part of this is that the joint 
deliberative agency, by which the couple form their collective, necessarily 
involves an ongoing sensitivity of each to the will of the other. this, it 
might be thought, rules out each party being directly constrained by the 
collective will, for their being so constrained might be seen as a block 
on each having such sensitivity. so for Westlund  “... any balance that is 
struck between the parties must be regarded as defeasible in the face of 
further reflection and experience, such that a shared practical perspective 
is always a work in progress” (Westlund 2008, 568). i will refer to this in 
what follows as the requirement of flexibility.
there are two reasons to reject Westlund’s rejection of direct normative 
constraint; firstly because of its importance to Gilbert’s overall project, 
5 merely suggesting that gilbert’s claim is “controversial” and pointing to others (Bratman 
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and secondly, because direct normative constraint does seem to be part 
of the actual phenomenology of being in a CRR. On the first point, a full 
defence would require an overall defence of gilbert’s project that is beyond 
the scope of this paper but it is worth noting that the ability to explain 
the normative authority of plural subject attitudes as arising directly from 
the nature of joint commitment is what makes gilbert’s account distinctly 
collectivist and thus able to explain the phenomenology that (she claims) 
individualistic accounts cannot.
on my second claim; it seems to me disputable that we experience crrs 
as necessarily having the flexibility that Westlund describes. It is true 
that when a relationship is healthy each party tries to take the needs of 
the other into account when engaged in joint deliberation. in the holiday 
example we would say that if the couple, mary and clare, are in a well 
functioning crr then each party should try to accommodate the desires 
of the other and to compromise when these do not fit with their own. 
even once they have come to their collective decision, i.e. once they have 
constructed their collective will, then if they truly care for each other each 
will be open to the possibility of further deliberation over its content. this 
doesn’t mean that the collective will itself must be automatically reflective 
of any change in each individuals perspective. if mary comes to realise 
that she hates hot nights, then this does mean that (given clare’s love for 
her) clare ought to be open to re-engaging in joint deliberation and to 
their jointly changing their mind, but it does not imply that the collective 
will must automatically cease to hold sway. in parallel with gilbert’s 
walkers i suggest that if on the way to the airport mary turned round and 
stated walking back home, Clare would be justified to say: “You can’t go 
home, we said we were going to majorca!”
Further to Westlund looking for flexibility in the wrong place in healthy 
crrs, she also idealises love by ignoring the fact that unhealthy Crrs still 
count as Crrs6. Feelings of being a we do not necessarily disappear with the 
failure of each party to treat the other with reciprocity. once we allow 
the phenomenology of badly functioning crrs into our picture then the 
fact that there is no necessary flexibility at the level of the collective will 
becomes all the more apparent. given that Westlund seems to believe 
that being bound to the collective will requires an additional personal 
commitment she would have to say that the shared perspective merely 
dissolves in the face of one, or both, parties ceasing to continuously 
6 a similar point (though not directed at Westlund) is noted by gilbert, 1996.
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reaffirm the framework which takes the other into account; but this is 
misguided as even in bad relationships we can feel the constraining force 
of the collective will.
While gilbert gets closer to the phenomenology of love than Westlund, i 
will now argue there is something overly restrictive in her set up, just that 
it is not what Westlund thinks it is. my claim is that there is variance in 
the levels of what we might call “normative pain” when rebelling against 
the plural will of different crrs. Just as we can understand physical pain 
as a negative feeling, of variable strength, experience of which indicates 
bodily damage, normative pain is negative feeling, of variable in strength, 
experience of which indicates normative transgression. this is, i believe, 
evident in the cases described below. unfortunately, for showing this to 
be the case, the direct normative commitment of the will that gilbert 
describes is not the only thing that provides reasons for the individual 
to feel tied to the we in cases of love – there are of course also moral, 
romantic, practical and further reasons in play. my claim is not that these 
other reasons do not matter – only that direct normative constraint of the 
will plays an important part in the mix. i’ll proceed by contrasting three 
examples to illustrate the variability of normative pain:
Early days: imagine a newly formed couple, Bill and ted. they have been 
together for a few months, seeing each other once or twice a week. they 
see themselves as very much in love, they are full of the strong feelings of 
lust and desire, but live in separate houses, have separate groups of friends 
and different hobbies.
Long term and going strong: now contrast this with our couple from the 
example above, clare and mary. let’s say that they have been together for 
25 years, bought a house together, adopted and raised a child together, 
share friends and have the same hobbies. they feel still very much in love.
Coming apart: Patrick and madeleine have been in a relationship longest 
of all, 30 years. they do live together, and pay bills jointly and have raised 
children. But they also do an increasing amount of things apart, have 
separate friendship groups and enjoy different social activities. they don’t 
really feel much romance toward each other and often find themselves 
attracted to other people.
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one of each of them turns round and starts walking back home. each rebel 
will be open to a rebuke of gilbert’s form: “you can’t go home, we said we 
were going to majorca!” however, i suggest that the act of rebelling, will 
feel different (in a relevant way) to each; When ted turns round to Bill 
and announces that he is not going, the wrong that he is committing by 
violating the collective will feel less normatively painful than that which 
will be felt by mary in doing the same. similarly, the wrong of madeleine’s 
doing so will feel worse than ted’s, though not as normatively painful as 
mary’s deviation.
i am not claiming that any of the couples face no obligation towards their 
collective wills, rather that the degree of normative pain of breaking these 
obligations will vary. it is the existence of this phenomenon and the way 
in which it mimics a certain aspect of Westlund’s description of flexibility 
that accounts for a certain level of intuitive plausibility to Westlund’s 
rejection of gilbert’s account of direct normative constraint. of course 
this could all be a function of variance in other factors; the different level 
of moral, romantic, practical obligations felt by each party. however, that 
the rebuke may feel more normatively painful to madeleine (who is not 
getting that much out of her relationship any more) than to ted (who is 
infatuated) suggests to me that the difference lies in the nature of the we 
rather than the personal feelings of each party. Further, given that the 
rebuke makes direct reference to the will of the we, i think we should look 
for variance towards this relation to explain this phenomenon.
so, how can we make sense of the variability between the couples? in what 
follows i give a rough sketch of the type of account i think could do this7. 
such an replaces gilbert’s discrete, all-or-nothing, voluntary pooling of 
the wills with a continuous notion of wills becoming entangled through 
levels of necessary identification with the plural subject. The variance in 
the three holiday cases will thus be explained by variance in the amount 
to which the individuals cannot help but identify with the collective, 
where this variance will in turn be explained by how much of their own 
lives have been lived, and thus only fully make sense, within the scope of 
the collective agency.
the background to this claim is an understanding of what it is about 
commitments of the will in general that bind us. What is wrong, one 
7 the argument here is condensed because of limitations of space, i proving an extended 
account in Kisolo-ssonko (forthcoming).
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might ask, with agentive anarchism, i.e. doing whatever one feels the 
compulsion to do at any time and not feeling committed by what one 
has willed? according to michael Bratman our seeing ourselves as being 
constrained by the commitments’ of our wills is necessary for us to be able 
to understand ourselves as agents who can govern our own lives8. this is 
because the commitments of our wills provide the scaffolding necessary to 
construct a place “where-i-stand stand” out of the  multiple of elements of 
our psychological stew. i propose that we can extend this claim to explain 
the normative power of commitments of the collective wills for couples in 
crrs; i.e. that each lover must see themselves as constrained by the will of 
the we that they are part of in order to see that we as a unified agent that 
can act9.
the case is not completely symmetrical between individuals and 
collectives. For individuals one always needs to have a where-i-stand as if 
we can’t see ourselves as individual agents there is nowhere left to retreat. 
it follows that there is no variability in the normative pain of breaking 
with our own wills10. For a collective we do always need to have a where-
we-stand for the possibility of collective agency. however, there is at least 
some possibility of retreating back to our own individual agency. What 
stops such a retreat being too easy is that part of our understanding of 
ourselves will be bound up in being able to see the collective as acting. 
insofar as we have already lived part of our lives through the collective 
we can only continue to understand our contributory action as the kind of 
thing we set it out to be if we are able to see the collective as an agent, and 
because this requires its commitments of will to constrain, we must see 
them as doing so11. this difference between the foundation of the power 
of the individual will and the collective will is, i believe, what explains the 
variability in the three holidaying couples. the variability comes from the 
fact that though we will always have some part of ourselves bound up with 
the we, the amount of this entanglement can vary (with length of time of 
collective etc.).
acknowledging variability in the experience of normative pain requires 
a re-understanding of gilbert by moving away from voluntary wills being 
8 Bratman (1999, 2007).
9 note that this is not a use that Bratman has need to employ for he rejects the idea of direct 
normative constraint by a collective will.
10 or at least if there is variance it is not of this sort.
11 Post-hoc reconceptualising our contributions is logically possible but seems to be a kind of 
inauthenticity for that is how, at the moment of our actions, we set them out to be.
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pooled to wills becoming entangled over time perhaps in a sub-voluntary 
way, but I contend that this fits better with our phenomenological 
experience of being in love. Imagining one’s life without one’s significant 
other, imaging the non-existence of this we, is thus a conceptual issue 
rather than just an epistemic one – and this is how it grounds normative 
constraint. 
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